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"[T]he moment the child is born, the mother is also born.  [She] never 
existed before.  The woman existed, but the mother, never.  And a 
mother is something absolutely new."  — Osho, Indian Philosopher1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The practice of surrogate motherhood has existed since ancient 
times.  In the Bible, when Sarah found herself infertile, she asked her 
husband, Abraham, to impregnate her slave, Hagar, so that they might 
“build a family through her.”2  This was not surrogacy as we think of it 
today because it involved sexual intercourse, but the idea of having a 
child gestated by a woman other than the father’s wife existed even 
back then.  Conflict grew between Sarah and Hagar, which led 
Abraham to send Hagar and the child away.3  Conflict between 
intended mothers and surrogates4 still happens today,5 and, when it 
does, the results can be disastrous.     
What would you do if someone took your child?  Imagine that 
you entered into a surrogacy contract with a woman to have her 
inseminated with your own, your partner’s, or a donor’s sperm.  The 
contract stated that the resulting child would be yours, and she would 
merely be carrying the child for you as a surrogate.  You waited with 
excitement for this child.  You picked out his or her name, decorated 
his or her room, and read books on parenting.  You went to the doctor 
                                                 
 
* Frank J. Bewkes is an LL.M. candidate at the New York University School of Law.  
He has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Yale University and a Juris 
Doctor from The George Washington University Law School.  Mr. Bewkes would 
like to thank his professors, Stephanie Ridder and Karen Thornton, for shepherding 
him through the writing process.  He is also grateful to his parents for their 
unwavering support, and he would like to dedicate this article to his mother, Susan 
Frank Kelley.   
1 OSHO, BE OCEANIC 9 (Ma Prem Maneesha & Swami Prem Amrito eds., 2007).   
2 Genesis 16:2-4 (New International Version). 
3 Genesis 21:9-14 (New International Version). 
4 There is some debate about the proper terminology to use when referring to a 
woman who gestates a baby for others.  The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, for example, has adopted the term “gestational mother” 
because it is supposedly more precise.  See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 452-53 (2d ed. 2013).  “Mother” is a loaded term in 
the world of assisted reproductive technology; therefore, the term “surrogate” will be 
used throughout this paper to describe a woman who gestates a child for others 
without intent to be the child’s mother.   
5 Conflict is not common, and one estimate puts the percentage of surrogacy 
arrangements that have resulted in legal disputes at a hundredth of a percent.  Id. at 
422 (citing Elly Teman, The Social Construction of Surrogacy Research: An 
Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholarship on Surrogate Motherhood, 
67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1104 (2008)).  
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appointments and saw the sonograms.  You already love this child.  
And yet, when the time came to surrender the child, the surrogate 
changed her mind.  She claimed that she could not and would not give 
up the baby.  She fled the state, or perhaps the country.  She called 
herself the child’s mother.  Such is the danger of surrogacy.  And yet, 
the practice continues.   
This paper addresses the fact that traditional surrogates are 
considered mothers of the children they carry in almost every state.  
Traditional surrogacy is not often addressed in current scholarship 
because it is disfavored for putting intended parents on unsteady legal 
ground.  The recognition of maternity in traditional surrogates 
empowers them to change their minds after the birth and keep the 
child, an outcome unacceptable to intended parents.  Changing how 
traditional surrogates are viewed would rectify the situation.  
Traditional surrogates should not be seen as mothers. 
Part II is an exploration into how gestational and traditional 
surrogacy are treated differently, or similarly, in several states based 
upon whether traditional surrogates are presumed to be mothers.  Part 
III discusses the fact that sperm and egg donors are almost never 
considered the parents of children resulting from their donations.  Part 
IV discusses the concept of parenthood by intent, embracing 
California’s view of surrogacy and taking it a step further.  Traditional 
surrogates should not have parental rights because they are simply egg 
donor and gestational surrogate combined in one person.  If each 
separately should not give rise to motherhood, then both together 
should not give rise to motherhood.  Issues of autonomy and feminism 
are also addressed in Part IV.  Part V discusses the best interest of the 
child, and why best interest is irrelevant in a surrogacy framework 
embracing parenthood by intent.  Finally, Part VI discusses two model 
policy recommendations that come close to embodying the spirit of 
motherhood by intent and prohibiting traditional surrogates from 
changing their minds.   
There are two types of surrogacy agreements, each defined by 
whether or not the surrogate is the egg donor.6  In traditional 
surrogacy, the surrogate is artificially inseminated with the semen of 
the intended father or a donor, which combines with her own egg to 
form an embryo.7  The traditional surrogate is, therefore, also the 
genetic mother of the resulting child.8  Meanwhile, in gestational 
                                                 
 
6 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 152 (2d ed. 
2011).   
7Id. at 152-53.   
8 Id.   
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surrogacy, in vitro fertilization is used.9  The egg of a donor, or of the 
intended mother, is fertilized with sperm outside of the womb and the 
resulting embryo is implanted in a gestational surrogate.10  Thus, a 
gestational surrogate has no genetic connection to the child she 
carries.11 
 In re Baby M was the first case to address the issue of 
surrogacy, and it presented facts much like the nightmare scenario 
previously mentioned.12  William and Elizabeth Stern wanted a child, 
but Mrs. Stern had a condition that made pregnancy risky.13  They 
entered into a traditional surrogacy contract with Mary Beth 
Whitehead, and Mrs. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Mr. 
Stern’s sperm.14  The arrangement progressed smoothly at first, as 
most do.15  Mrs. Whitehead wanted to give the Sterns the “gift of 
life.”16  Unfortunately, “Mrs. Whitehead realized, almost from the 
moment of birth, that she could not part with [Baby M],”17 and she 
fled the state, leading to a now-famous court battle over custody of the 
child.18  Though the Sterns were ultimately granted custody, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court stated that Mrs. Whitehead was the “natural 
mother” of Baby M.19   Therefore, any contract where she irrevocably 
surrendered her rights to the child prior to birth was unenforceable 
because the law allowed for only voluntary post-birth surrender and 
subsequent adoption.20   
Twenty-five years later, views have changed little with regard 
to traditional surrogates like Mary Beth Whitehead and their status as 
legal mothers.  In the wake of In re Baby M, several states moved to 
                                                 
 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 91. 
11 Id. at 153. 
12 See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
13 Id. at 1235. 
14 Id. 
15 See Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 94 (2007) (“[O]nly a handful of the hundreds of 
traditional surrogacy agreements brokered in the United States since Noel Keane 
wrote the first some thirty years ago have resulted in litigation.”);  see also Elizabeth 
S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.  
PROBS. 109, 138 (2009) (citing Janice C. Ciccarelli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating 
Rough Waters: An Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 21, 31-32 (2005)) (“[F]ew surrogates report reluctance to relinquish the child, 
and a very small percentage express regret about having served in the role.”). 
16 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236.   
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1237. 
19 Id. at 1240.   
20 Id.  
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regulate, ban, and, in a few cases, even criminalize surrogacy.21  
Today, there are still many states that lack clear statutes or case law 
regarding surrogacy, particularly traditional surrogacy.22  Despite this, 
there is a strong trend towards recognizing traditional surrogates as 
mothers of the children they bear.23  For intended parents this is, 
understandably, a cause for concern.   
The first traditional surrogacy contract was written by Noel 
Keane, “the undisputed father of surrogate motherhood,”24 in 1976.25  
It was not until 1980, however, that the first traditional surrogacy was 
carried out.26  Gestational surrogacy came later in 1985 as in vitro 
fertilization technology improved.27  It would be several years before 
gestational surrogacy really caught on.28  Today, gestational surrogacy 
is the more popular option of the two, with an estimated ninety-five 
percent of surrogacy agreements involving gestational surrogacy.29  In 
fact, “thirty percent of surrogacy agencies in the U.S. now offer only 
gestational surrogacy.”30  This is unsurprising given that traditional 
surrogacy agreements are likely unenforceable because courts are 
unwilling to force surrogates to give up their biological children.31 
                                                 
 
21 Andrew H. Malcolm, Steps to Control Surrogate Births Rekindle Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/26/us/steps-to-control-
surrogate-births-rekindle-debate.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.   
22 Diane S. Hinson, State-by-State Surrogacy Law: Actual Practices, 34 FAM. 
ADVOC. 36 (2011).  
23 See discussion infra Part II. 
24 Sanger, supra note 15, at 83 (citing James S. Kunen, Childless Couples Seeking 
Surrogate Mothers Call Michigan Lawyer Noel Keane--He Delivers, TIME, Mar. 30, 
1987, at 93).   
25 Lawrence van Gelder, Noel Keane, 58, Lawyer in Surrogate Mother Cases, is 
Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/28/nyregion/noel-keane-58-lawyer-in-surrogate-
mother-cases-is-dead.html.   
26 See The History of Surrogacy, MOD. FAM. SURROGACY CENTER, 
http://www.modernfamilysurrogacy.com/page/surrogacy_history (last visited Dec. 
30, 2014) (discussing a basic history of surrogacy in America).   
27 Id.; see also Diane S. Hinson & Maureen McBrien, Surrogacy Across America, 34 
FAM. ADVOC. 32, 32-33 (2011). 
28 See Sanger, supra note 15, at 79 (citing Direct Testimony of William Stern (Jan. 5, 
1987), in 1 BABY M CASE: THE COMPLETE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS 82-83 (1988)) (“[A]t 
that time nobody in this country was doing it, it was strictly experimental.”). 
29 Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 32-33.  See also Sanger, supra note 15, at 79 
(citing Fact Sheet 56: Surrogacy (Gestational Carrier), RESOLVE: THE NAT’L 
INFERTILITY ASS’N, 2 (2004), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-
options/surrogacy/.). 
30 Sanger, supra note 15, at 79 n.56 (citing Mhairi Galbraith et al., Commercial 
Agencies and Surrogate Motherhood: A Transaction Cost Approach, 26 HEALTH 
CARE ANALYSIS 11 (2005)).   
31 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 6, at 153. 
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Surrogacy is important because it is the only way for many 
individuals to produce offspring to whom they are genetically related.  
With surrogacy, at least one of the intended parents is able to have a 
genetic link to the child.32  Many people desire this link.33  As John 
Hill put it, “while adoption may satisfy one's desire to provide 
nurturance for a child, adoption cannot satisfy the yearning to create 
the child and to watch as a version of oneself unfolds and develops.”34  
One could feasibly accomplish this with either gestational or 
traditional surrogacy, but the high costs of in vitro fertilization place 
gestational surrogacy out of reach for many individuals.35  Thus, for 
low income individuals, traditional surrogacy may be the only way to 
have a genetic link to their child.   
The problem with traditional surrogacy is that, in most states, 
the traditional surrogate is presumed to be the mother of the child she 
carries, either because she birthed the child or because of the 
confluence of gestation and genetics.36  Thus, the arrangement is 
treated as a post-birth adoption, leaving the surrogate free to change 
her mind after the birth.37  This would not be an issue, however, if 
traditional surrogates were not presumed to be the mothers of the 
children they carry.   
The moral issues of surrogacy are unquestionable, but they are 
not the concern here.  The concern here is with motherhood.  The fact 
of an occurrence or status is, or at least should be, unaffected by its 
morality.  Becoming a mother is a fact, regardless of whether it is 
through surrogacy or not.  This paper tries to redefine the current 
                                                 
 
32 There are some cases of gestational surrogacy where neither intended parent is 
genetically related to the child.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  One could also imagine a traditional surrogacy 
scenario where donor sperm is used.   
33 See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of 
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 389-90 (1991) 
(discussing the desire to have a genetic connection to one’s child and why so many 
choose assisted reproductive technology over adoption).   
34 Id. at 389.   
35 See The “Surrogacy Parenting Agreement Act of 2013”: Hearing on Bill 20-32 
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary & Pub. Safety (2013) (statement of Nancy 
Polikoff, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law), available at 
http://lims.dccouncil.us/_layouts/15/uploader/Download.aspx?legislationid=29188&f
ilename=B20-0032-HearingRecord1.pdf (“Gestational surrogacy, whose costs easily 
exceed $100,000, is limited to the richest among us.”); see also Kristen Fischer, 
Little Miracles Can Cost Big: The Economics of In-Vitro Fertilization, HEALTHLINE 
NEWS (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.healthline.com/health-news/women-the-high-
cost-of-in-vitro-fertilization-101613.    
36 Hill, supra note 33, at 372. 
37 See discussion infra Part II.   
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understanding of the genesis of motherhood to encompass intended 
mothers who enter traditional surrogacy agreements.   
 
II. A SURVEY OF SURROGACY AND THE VESTING OF 
“MOTHERHOOD” UPON BIRTH 
 
 In discussing the question of who is rightfully a mother of a 
child born through traditional surrogacy, it is necessary to first 
mention what motherhood means in a legal sense.  Without this 
understanding, the dispute between intended mothers and traditional 
surrogates has no context.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
summarized the importance of parental rights in Stanley v. Illinois:   
 
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of 
the family.  The rights to conceive and to raise one's 
children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights 
of man, and rights far more precious . . . than property 
rights.  It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.  The 
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Ninth Amendment.38 
 
In short, the right of motherhood is one of the most important rights 
there is.   
 It is also important to note that assisted reproductive 
technology, such as surrogacy, occupies a fast-changing and somewhat 
obscured legal area.  Most surrogacy cases occur in family court, and 
the records are sealed.39  As such, the law “as it is practiced” can be 
entirely different than what a jurisdiction’s statutes and published case 
law might suggest.40  As such, this paper will focus on statutes and 
published case law to explore how different jurisdictions view 
                                                 
 
38 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
39 Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 32. 
40 Id.  In Arizona, for example, both traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy 
are prohibited by statute and unenforceable, but surrogacy is still practiced.  Hinson, 
supra note 22, at supp. 2; see also Surrogacy in Phoenix, AZ, FERTILITY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fertilityauthority.com/articles/surrogacy-phoenix-az (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014).   
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surrogates and how gestational and traditional surrogates are treated 
differently.  For the purposes of this analysis, we will look at three 
types of jurisdictions: those that presume both types of surrogate are 
mothers, those that presume only traditional surrogates are mothers, 
and those that do not presume surrogates of any type are mothers.  
Typing is done by looking to whether the surrogate is permitted to 
change her mind and refuse to relinquish the baby after the birth.  This 
is based on the understanding that a mother cannot be forced to 
relinquish a baby in such a way, but a non-mother can.   
 
A. All Surrogates Are Mothers 
 
i. New Jersey 
New Jersey was one of the first United States jurisdictions to 
address surrogacy in its courts.41  As mentioned above, in the Baby M 
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the surrogacy 
contract between the Sterns and the Whiteheads was invalid because it 
conflicted with both the statutes and the public policies of the state.42  
The court’s decision spells out the arguments against traditional 
surrogacy, mainly that a traditional surrogate is a mother.43  The 
statutory reasons given for finding the contract unenforceable were 
that the compensation aspect made it comparable to baby-selling, the 
proper procedure for termination of parental rights had not been 
followed, and “surrender of custody and consent to adoption” is 
“revocable in private placement adoptions.”44  All three of these 
reasons are only issues if the traditional surrogate is considered a 
mother.   
Indeed, the court refers to Mary Beth Whitehead as the “natural 
mother” of Baby M throughout the opinion.45  Under New Jersey law, 
“[t]he natural mother, may be established by proof of her having given 
birth to the child.”46  Presumably, this statute originates from the legal 
principle of mater semper certa est, or “the mother is always certain,” 
meaning that whoever gives birth to a child is that child’s mother.47  
                                                 
 
41 Scott, supra note 15, at 112-13 n.19. 
42 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.   
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 See generally id.   
46 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-41 (West 2013). 
47 See Mater Semper Certa Est, WORLD HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.worldheritage.org/articles/Mater_semper_certa_est (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014); see also GERDA A. KLEIJKAMP, FAMILY LIFE AND FAMILY INTERESTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
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For the vast majority of human history this was true.  In fact, Aristotle 
once commented that “mothers are fonder of their children than 
fathers” because they are surer they are their own, having birthed 
them.48  Indeed, in the Baby M case, Mary Beth Whitehead’s genetic 
connection to the child was only mentioned once, so that was likely 
not the basis for the court’s opinion.49 
The court also took issue with the termination of Mary Beth 
Whitehead’s parental rights.50  Under New Jersey law, termination of 
parental rights can only occur through “an action by an approved 
agency, an action by [the Division of Youth and Family Services], or 
an action in connection with a private placement adoption.”51  But 
none of those actions occurred.52  Because the court saw Mary Beth 
Whitehead as the mother of the child, they essentially viewed the 
arrangement as an adoption gone wrong.53  Of particular concern to the 
court was the fact that the contract claimed to embody the best 
interests of the child, the standard used in custody disputes in almost 
every jurisdiction, as if parents can simply decide what those best 
interests are without reference to any standard.54  Rather, the court 
stated: 
 
The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent 
separation of the child from one of its natural parents.  
Our policy, however, has long been that to the extent 
possible, children should remain with and be brought 
up by both of their natural parents . . . .  The impact of 
failure to follow that policy is nowhere better shown 
than in the results of this surrogacy contract.  A child, 
instead of starting off its life with as much peace and 
                                                                                                                   
 
HUMAN RIGHTS ON DUTCH FAMILY LAW AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION ON AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 159-60 (1999) (discussing the 
concept of mater semper certa est);  K. ZWEIGERT & K. DROBNIG, INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 28 (1991) (discussing the same).   
48ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IX, at 7 (W.D. Ross trans.) (c. 384 
B.C.E.).   
49 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248. 
50 Id. at 1240. 
51 Id. at 1242. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 1234. 
54 Id. at 1246 (“The contract's basic premise, that the natural parents can decide in 
advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no relationship to 
the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody.”). 
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security as possible, finds itself immediately in a tug-
of-war between contending mother and father.55 
 
In other words, Baby M was being separated from the person the court 
saw as her mother, which courts generally do not believe is in a child’s 
best interest.56  According to the court, both Mary Beth Whitehead and 
William Stern had an equal right to the child, and the surrogacy 
contract by which Mary Beth disposed of her rights was, therefore, 
invalid.57   
 Gestational surrogates have been treated the same as traditional 
surrogates in New Jersey.58  In A.H.W. v. G.H.B, a heterosexual couple 
combined the woman’s egg with the man’s sperm to create an embryo 
that would be implanted in and gestated by the woman’s sister because 
the woman was unable to carry a child.59  The couple then sought a 
pre-birth order declaring themselves the legal parents of the child.60  
The court denied the petition for the pre-birth declaration of parentage, 
holding that the voluntary surrender of the child by the gestational 
surrogate is only valid if executed seventy-two hours after birth.61  The 
gestational surrogate was seen as a mother and the surrogacy 
arrangement, while allowed, was treated like an adoption.62  The 
gestational surrogate was treated as the mother of the child, even 
though the intended mother was also the genetic mother.63   
The seventy-two hour requirement was reaffirmed in A.G.R. v. 
D.R.H, when a sister serving as a gestational surrogate for her brother 
and his partner changed her mind and retained her maternal rights, 
since their pre-birth surrender agreement was unenforceable.64  In that 
case, the Court further held gestational and traditional surrogacy to be 
                                                 
 
55 Id. at 1246-47. 
56 Hill, supra note 33, at 364 (citing Irma S. Russell, Within the Best Interests of the 
Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes Arising from Surrogacy 
Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L. 587, 622 (1989)) (“[A]ll states apply a presumption that 
placement of the child with its natural parent is in the best interests of the child.”). 
57 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1247.   
58 New Jersey, State-by-State Surrogacy Law, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, 
http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map/new-jersey-surrogacy-laws 
(last visited September 27, 2014). 
59 A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
60 Id. at 950. 
61 Id. at 954; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (West 2013).   
62 A.H.W., 772 A.2d at 954. 
63 Id. 
64 A.G.R. v. D.R.H., No. FD-09-001838-07, slip op. at 2-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
Dec. 23, 2009), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf. 
2014]              THE PROBLEM OF TRADITIONAL SURROGACY                 153  
 
indistinguishable, recognizing both types of surrogates as mothers 
regardless of genetics.65 
 
ii. New Hampshire 
Unlike New Jersey, New Hampshire has a statutory scheme 
specifically allowing surrogacy.66  The New Hampshire statutes define 
“birth mother” as “a woman who gestates an embryo conceived by 
natural or artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, preembryo 
transfer or as a result of a surrogacy contract.”67  In other words, both 
traditional and gestational surrogates are considered mothers by virtue 
of their gestation of the child.68  Meanwhile, “surrogate” is defined as 
“a woman who agrees, pursuant to a surrogacy contract, to bear a child 
for intended parents.”69     
The New Hampshire statutes provide for the automatic transfer 
of parental rights to the intended parents, provided that all the proper 
procedures have been followed.70  These procedures require judicial 
preauthorization of the surrogacy contract,71 and the contract must 
allow the surrogate seventy-two hours in which she may change her 
mind and keep the baby.72  In fact, despite the statutory scheme and 
judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy contract, the intended 
parents are not vested with parenthood until after the seventy-two 
hours have passed at which point they may be recorded on the child’s 
birth certificate.73  If extenuating circumstances exist that “prevent the 
surrogate from making an informed decision” within the seventy-two 
hour window, the decision window may be extended up to one week.74   
 
iii. Louisiana 
Louisiana also presumes both types of surrogate to be mothers, 
though the law is mostly silent on the issue of surrogacy.75  Only 
traditional surrogacy for compensation is addressed explicitly, with all 
                                                 
 
65 Id at 5.   
66 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (2013).   
67 Id. § 168-B:1(II).  
68 See also id. § 168-B:2 (“A woman is the mother of a child to whom she has given 
birth, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”). 
69 Id. § 168-B:1 (XIV). 
70 Id. § 168-B:4. 
71 Id. § 168-B:23. 
72 Id. § 168-B:25(IV). 
73 Id. § 168-B:26. 
74 Id. § 168-B:25(IV)(b). 
75 See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4. 
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such contracts being declared void.76  In that statute, traditional 
surrogacy is referred to as “surrogate motherhood.”77  Uncompensated 
traditional surrogacy occurs, but is treated like an adoption, with the 
traditional surrogate having the right to refuse to relinquish the child 
after the birth.78  Louisiana, with few exceptions, defines motherhood 
by whoever births the child.79  This is made more apparent when one 
considers Louisiana’s proposed 2013 legislation, which would have 
made all traditional surrogacy agreements void, regardless of whether 
they were compensated or not.80  A comment on that portion of the bill 
read, “A surrogacy arrangement that would allow a mother to agree to 
relinquish her biological child in advance of its birth violates the 
public policy of this state and is, therefore, unenforceable, whether the 
contract is gratuitous or onerous.”81   
 Meanwhile, “Louisiana law is silent as to gestational 
surrogacy agreements between non-relatives…,”82 though such 
agreements do occur and, being unenforceable, are treated as 
adoptions.83  The exception is when a gestational surrogacy agreement 
involves a gestational surrogate “who is related by blood or affinity to 
a biological parent” of the child.84  In those cases, “the biological 
parents proven to be the mother and father by DNA testing shall be 
considered the parents of the child.”85  This is the only exception to the 
statutory rule that the woman who gives birth to a child is its mother.86  
Despite this, it remains unclear what happens if custody is disputed 
between the intended or biological parents and their related gestational 
surrogate.  Likely, the agreement would be unenforceable, and the 
gestational surrogate would be allowed to change her mind.87 
 
 
                                                 
 
76 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (2013). 
77 Id. § 9:2713(B) (emphasis added). 
78 Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4.   
79 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2013).   
80 See H.R. 433, 39th Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); S.R. 162, 39th Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).   
81 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184.  
82 Katherine S. Spaht, Who's Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies? Louisiana's 
New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307, 335 (2007).   
83 See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4.   
84 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(1)(j) (Supp. 2013).  The intended parents in this 
case must be a married couple and must submit both the sperm and the egg used for 
the procedure, making them the genetic parents.  Id. § 40:32. 
85 Id. § 40:34(B)(1)(j); see also id. § 40:34(B)(1)(i).   
86 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2013).   
87 See Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 4 (stating that surrogacy contracts are not 
enforceable in Louisiana).   
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iv. Florida 
Florida is unique among the states in having a statutory scheme 
specifically allowing traditional surrogacy.88  However, traditional 
surrogates are seen as mothers.89  Not only are the surrogacy 
agreements treated as adoptions, but they are explicitly called “pre-
planned” adoptions.90  According to Florida law,   
 
A preplanned adoption agreement must include, but 
need not be limited to, the following terms: . . .  That 
the volunteer mother agrees…to bear the child, and to 
terminate any parental rights and responsibilities to the 
child she might have through a written consent 
executed at the same time as the preplanned adoption 
agreement, subject to a right of rescission by the 
volunteer mother any time within 48 hours after the 
birth of the child, if the volunteer mother is genetically 
related to the child . . . .  That the intended father 
and intended mother acknowledge that they may not 
receive custody or the parental rights under the 
agreement if the volunteer mother terminates the 
agreement or if the volunteer mother rescinds her 
consent to place her child for adoption within 48 hours 
after the birth of the child, if the volunteer mother is 
genetically related to the child.91  
 
Even if the traditional surrogate relinquishes the child to the intended 
parents, a court must still review and approve the adoption.92   
Gestational surrogates in Florida are also seen as mothers, 
though this is less obvious.   
A gestational surrogacy contract in Florida must contain a provision 
stating that the surrogate will relinquish her parental rights upon the 
birth of the child.93  Although the intended parents, so long as one of 
them is the genetic parent, are “presumed to be the natural parents of 
the child,” they are not vested with parental rights upon the birth of the 
child.94  Rather, the intended parents must file a petition for a court 
                                                 
 
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. § 63.213(2) (emphasis added). 
92 Id. § 63.213(1)(a). 
93 Id. § 742.15(3)(c). 
94 Id. § 742.16(7). 
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hearing within three days of the birth, and at the hearing a judge enters 
a final post-birth order declaring the child’s parentage.95  Thus, before 
the order, the gestational surrogate is legally the mother.   
 
B. Only Traditional Surrogates Are Mothers 
 
Even states that are willing to allow gestational surrogacy, but 
deny gestational surrogates parental rights in favor of the intended 
parents, still see traditional surrogacy as different.96  Traditional 
surrogates are seen as mothers, even when gestational surrogates are 
not.  Nowhere is this as clear as it is in North Dakota.  In one statute, 
North Dakota explicitly declares the intended parents to be the parents 
of children born through gestational surrogacy arrangements.97  Then, 
in another statute, North Dakota explicitly declares traditional 
surrogacy agreements void, and names traditional surrogates as the 
mothers of the children they carry.98  The following two examples of 
California and Massachusetts further emphasize the difference that 
many states see between the maternity claim of a gestational surrogate, 
and the maternity claim of a traditional surrogate. 
 
i. California 
California is extremely friendly towards gestational surrogacy 
by denying gestational surrogates maternal rights.99  For example, in 
Johnson v. Calvert, Mark and Crispina Calvert entered into a contract 
with Anna Johnson, who agreed to gestate a child created from their 
egg and sperm.100  The relationship between the two parties soured, 
and Anna Johnson brought an action to have herself declared the 
mother of the child she gestated.101  The court then faced the fact that 
California law recognized both genetics and birth as two means of 
determining motherhood.102  Ultimately the court concluded that 
“when the two means [of determining motherhood] do not coincide in 
one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as 
                                                 
 
95 Id. § 742.16(1). 
96 See Hinson & McBrien, supra note 27, at 33-34. 
97 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2013). 
98 Id. § 14-18-05.  
99 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
100 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 782.   
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her own—is the natural mother under California law.”103  When faced 
with two seemingly legal mothers, the court used intent to tip the scale 
in favor of the intended and genetic mother.104   
The California Court of Appeals took this holding one step 
further by eliminating the need for intended parents to even be 
genetically related to the child.105  The case involved a dispute 
between intended parents, in which one disavowed parentage and the 
other claimed parentage.106  Ultimately, both intended parents were 
declared parents. 107  The court reasoned that intended parents are 
similarly positioned to the husband of a woman being artificially 
inseminated with donor sperm: “In each instance, a child is procreated 
because a medical procedure was initiated and consented to by 
intended parents.”108  The lack of a genetic connection to the child was 
deemed irrelevant in this case, as genetics and giving birth are cited as 
only two of several ways by which parentage may be proven or 
presumed.109   
Despite this progressive view towards gestational surrogacy, 
traditional surrogates are still considered mothers in California, and 
traditional surrogacy arrangements are treated as adoptions.110  
California courts first addressed the issue in In re Adoption of Matthew 
B., where a traditional surrogate tried to withdraw her consent to the 
adoption after the fact.111  The court noted that she had already given 
her “full and free consent” to the adoption.112  The validity of the 
“allegedly illegal” traditional surrogacy contract was deemed 
irrelevant, since the parties followed the proper adoption 
procedures,113 and the intended parents retained their status as adoptive 
parents.114  Later, in In re Marriage of Moschetta, a California court 
reaffirmed the notion that traditional surrogacy agreements must be 
treated as adoptions, granting the traditional surrogate parental rights 
because “[u]nder Family Code section 8814, an adoption statute, ‘birth 
                                                 
 
103 Id.  
104 Id. 
105 See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.   
109 Id. at 285.   
110 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); 
In re Adoption of Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
111 In re Matthew B., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 23.   
112 Id. at 28.   
113 Id. at 25 (“[Intended mother]'s adoption action relies not on the allegedly illegal 
contract, but on [traditional surrogate]'s signed consent.”). 
114 Id. at 37. 
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parents’ must specifically consent to an adoption in the presence of a 
social worker.  There was no such consent here.”115  When “the two 
usual means of showing maternity—genetics and birth—coincide in 
one woman,” as they do in traditional surrogacy, California sees the 
surrogate as the mother.116 
 
ii. Massachusetts 
 Like California, traditional surrogates in Massachusetts are 
seen as mothers, and traditional surrogacy is treated as adoption.117  
The traditional surrogate, as the legal mother, must give consent to the 
adoption, but not before four days after the birth.118  In R.R. v. M.H., a 
traditional surrogate changed her mind before the birth and wished to 
keep the child.119  The traditional surrogacy agreement she signed was 
not enforceable because her consent to relinquish the child could not 
be valid prior to four days after the birth, much less prior to birth.120 
 Gestational surrogacy agreements have been upheld in 
Massachusetts because gestational surrogates are not seen as mothers, 
but rather as “gestational carriers.”121  It is highly relevant in 
Massachusetts that a gestational surrogate is not genetically related to 
the child she carries.122  Intended parents who are also genetic parents 
may have their rights affirmed via a pre-birth order due to “the 
importance of establishing the rights and responsibilities of parents as 
soon as is practically possible.”123 
 
C. Neither Type of Surrogate Is The Mother: Arkansas? 
 
 Arkansas is arguably the most progressive state with regard to 
surrogacy and maternal rights.124  In Arkansas, “a child born by means 
of artificial insemination to a woman who is married at the time of the 
                                                 
 
115 In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900.   
116 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
117 Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001) 
(“In such an arrangement, the surrogate is both the genetic mother of the child and 
the mother who carries the child through pregnancy and delivery.  The child is thus, 
undisputedly, ‘her’ child to be surrendered for adoption.”). 
118 R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 2013).   
119 R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 793.   
120 Id. at 796.   
121 Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1135.   
122 See generally id. (mentioning “genetic” seventeen times throughout the opinion).   
123 Id. at 1139.   
124 Terrence T. Griffin, Surrogacy Agreements: Permitting Americans to Structure 
Work and Home, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1063, 1070-71 (2007). 
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birth of the child shall be presumed to be the child of the woman 
giving birth and the woman's husband except in the case of a surrogate 
mother.”125  In the case of a surrogate mother,  
 
[T]he child shall be that of: (1) The biological father 
and the woman intended to be the mother if the 
biological father is married; (2) The biological father 
only if unmarried; or (3) The woman intended to be the 
mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an 
anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial 
insemination.126 
 
At first glance, it seems that, in Arkansas, traditional surrogates 
are not presumed to be the mothers of the children they carry.  
However, this is tempered by the fact that in surrogacy cases, the 
woman giving birth is still “presumed to be the natural mother and 
shall be listed as such on the certificate of birth,” though a new birth 
certificate may be issued upon a court order declaring the intended 
parents the legal parents of the child.127   
The Arkansas Supreme Court has treated a traditional 
surrogacy arrangement like an adoption at least once before in In re 
Adoption of K.F.H.128  In that case, however, a Michigan court had 
already declared the surrogacy contract void under Michigan law and 
gave physical custody to the genetic and intended father.129  The 
dispute in that case was about adoption by the intended mother against 
the will of the traditional surrogate.130  The adoption was ultimately 
upheld because the traditional surrogate had not been in contact with 
the children for a year and a half.131  If the children in that case had 
been born in Arkansas, one wonders if adoption by the intended 
mother would have even been necessary, given the statutory 
presumptions in her favor.  However, the fact remains that the 
traditional surrogate is still seen as the default mother.132  Whether a 
pre-birth court order in favor of the intended parents could negate this 
(or even be granted) is an open question, though pre-birth orders for 
                                                 
 
125 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 See In re Adoption of K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343 (Ark. 1993). 
129 Id. at 344.   
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 345-46.   
132 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(2) (West 2013). 
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gestational surrogacy are routinely granted in Arkansas.133  Thus, even 
in the state where statutes are seemingly most welcoming to traditional 
surrogacy, there is ambiguity allowing for maternal rights to vest in 
traditional surrogates.   
 
III. EGG DONORS ARE NOT PARENTS 
 
 A traditional surrogate is essentially an egg donor and a 
gestational surrogate combined in one woman.134  The traditional 
surrogate, like a donor, intends at the outset of the agreement to 
“donate” her ova for use by other intended parents.135  So from where 
do the traditional surrogate’s maternal rights, recognized to varying 
degrees by essentially all fifty states, supposedly arise?  Certainly they 
do not arise from her mere genetic connection, nor should they.  A 
donor shares approximately the same amount of genetic material with 
any resulting child as would a full sibling of that child.136  As one 
scholar put it, “[I]f genetic similarity alone were sufficient for 
ascribing parental rights, an identical twin would possess a greater 
claim than the parent.”137  Genetic material, being a part of us, belongs 
to us, but this ownership does not extend to resulting children because 
“children are not property.”138  Additionally, a donor has presumably 
given up his or her ownership of his or her donated sperm or eggs prior 
to conception, so the ownership has already transferred prior to in vitro 
fertilization.139   
Many state legislatures have agreed that donors are not parents 
of children produced from their donated sperm or eggs.  As of this 
writing, Alabama, Delaware, Florida, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming 
                                                 
 
133 Arkansas, State-by-State Surrogacy Law, CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS, 
http://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/state-map/arkansas-surrogacy-laws (last 
visited September 27, 2014); see also Hinson, supra note 22, at supp. 2. 
134 KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 6, at 152. 
135 But see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Mass. 1998) (“[S]urrogate 
motherhood is never anonymous and her commitment and contribution is 
unavoidably much greater than that of a sperm donor.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The 
Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the Concept of Parenthood, 39 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 117 (1998) (“[T]he surrogate is different—not because 
she gestates the egg, which by itself gives her no rights, but because the egg never 
leaves her body.  The legal effect of a surrogacy contract thus turns on the 
alienability of property within the body.”).   
136 Hill, supra note 33, at 391. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 392. 
139 Id. at 391-92.   
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explicitly clarify that egg donors are not the parents of children 
conceived using their donated eggs.140  Most of these states derive 
their language directly from the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002, 
which reads that “a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by 
means of assisted reproduction.”141  An additional ten states142 have 
adopted some form of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, which had 
similar language, but only addressed sperm donors.143  A few other 
states have also adopted their own sperm donor non-parentage 
statutes144 without adopting the full Uniform Parentage Act.145  The 
Uniform Probate Code, adopted by almost forty percent of states,146 
also excludes donors from parenthood, though it is only meant to apply 
to issues of inheritance.147  Most recently, the American Bar 
                                                 
 
140 See ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (West 
2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 
(West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-60 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, § 555 (West 2013); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2013); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3) (West 
2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.705 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
902 (West 2013). 
141 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa_final_2002.pdf; see also id. 
§ 702 cmt. (“[T]his section shields all donors, whether of sperm or eggs, from 
parenthood in all situations in which either a married woman or a single woman 
conceives a child through [assisted reproductive technology] with the intent to be the 
child’s parent, either by herself or with a man . . .  .”).  
142 Those additional states are California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island.  See Legislative Fact 
Sheet: Parentage Act (1973), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act%20 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
143 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §5(b) (1973), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/upa73.pdf (“The donor of semen 
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married 
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived.”).   
144 “Donor non-parentage statute” is used here to refer to any statute that both refers 
to the parental status of a donor in relation to children born from his or her gametes 
and specifically excludes said donor from being the legal parent of such children.   
145 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2013). 
146 Legislative Fact Sheet: Probate Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2013).   
147 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b) (2010), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/upc%202010.pdf.  
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Association adopted the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, which similarly excludes donors from parenthood.148 
 Generally, where “[t]he language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous,” courts will not grant parental rights to sperm or egg 
donors.149  Courts even seem willing to enforce donor non-parentage 
statutes in situations where the letter of the law was not followed.  In 
one case, the Supreme Court of Kansas construed the donor non-
parentage statute somewhat loosely, glossing over a requirement that 
sperm be provided to a licensed physician, saying it was mere 
semantics.150  It seems that drawing clear lines for how a sperm or egg 
donation is supposed to occur is less important than upholding donor 
non-parentage statutes that give certainty to parents using artificial 
reproductive technology to conceive.151   
This interest in not “disturb[ing] the lives of the many 
expectant parties to anonymous, institutional sperm donation” was 
made explicit by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Ferguson v. 
McKiernan.152  The court in that case upheld a verbal agreement 
between a sperm donor and an intended mother who relieved him of 
child support duties in exchange for him not seeking parental rights.153  
The agreement and the parties’ initial adherence to it was deemed 
almost indistinguishable from “institutional sperm donation,” with the 
court noting “a growing consensus that clinical, institutional sperm 
donation neither imposes obligations nor confers privileges upon the 
sperm donor.”154 
                                                 
 
148 ABA. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY § 602 
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf 
(“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”).   
149 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1042 (Kan. 2007); see also Steven S. v. Deborah 
D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“The statute does not make an 
exception for known sperm donors, who will be denied a paternity claim so long as 
the semen was provided to a licensed physician for insemination of an unmarried 
woman.”); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that pursuant 
to the statute a sperm donor does not have standing to pursue an action to establish 
paternity).   
150 See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1042 (holding that the relevant donor non-parentage 
statute is satisfied when sperm is provided to intended mother who then provides it 
to a licensed physician).   
151 But see Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that a donor is not barred from seeking parentage by statute when the sperm 
was not provided to a licensed physician).  Despite the strict interpretation of the 
statute, the court in Jhordan C. acknowledged a clear public policy interest in not 
recognizing paternity claims from donors.  Id. at 537.   
152 Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007). 
153 Id. at 1245-46.   
154 Id. at 1246.   
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Occasionally, courts will grant parental rights to sperm and egg 
donors in unusual cases, such as when the egg donor is the lesbian 
partner of the intended mother.  In K.M. v. E.G., for example, the egg 
donor signed forms that ostensibly waived her rights to any resulting 
children.155  The egg donor contended, however, that she only agreed 
to donate her eggs because she understood that the couple would be 
raising the resulting children together, something the intended mother 
disputed.156  Ultimately, the Supreme Court of California held that: 
 
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate 
her lesbian partner, with the understanding that the 
resulting child will be raised in their joint home, cannot 
waive her responsibility to support that child.  Nor can 
such a purported waiver effectively cause that woman 
to relinquish her parental rights.157 
 
Essentially, the majority made an exception to the statutory rule of 
donor non-parentage for donor arrangements between lesbian 
couples.158  As one dissenter points out, the majority ignores the initial 
intent of the parties, calling into question all donor agreements.159  The 
majority limits the ability of lesbian partners “to create, before 
conception, settled and enforceable expectations about who would and 
would not become parents.”160 
 The Supreme Court of Florida recently held similarly in 
another case involving a lesbian couple.  In D.M.T. v. T.M.H., the 
court held that enforcement of the donor non-parentage statute in that 
case would unconstitutionally infringe upon the donor’s right to 
maintain a parent relationship with a child for whom she had already 
assumed full parental responsibilities until the custody dispute 
arose.161  The court analogized to a situation where an unmarried man 
impregnates an unmarried woman.162  Though the man in such a case 
“does not automatically have a fundamental right to be a parent to the 
child, his right to be a parent develops substantial constitutional 
                                                 
 
155 K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675-77 (Cal. 2005). 
156 Id.  
157 Id. at 682. 
158 See id. at 687 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); see also Heather A. Crews, Women Be 
Warned, Egg Donation Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be: The Copulation of Science 
and the Courts Makes Multiple Mommies, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 141, 154-55 (2005). 
159 K.M., 117 P.3d at 685 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
160 Id. at 688 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
161 D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 328 (Fla. 2013). 
162 Id. at 337. 
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protection as a fundamental right if he assumes responsibility for the 
care and raising of that child.”163  It was not the donor’s genetic 
connection to the child that made her a parent, rather her genetic 
connection merely gave her the opportunity to assume a parental 
role.164  The Supreme Court of Virginia applied a similar logic in L.F. 
v. Breit, ruling that donors cannot claim parentage through genetics 
alone, but may do so when they formally acknowledge their paternity 
or maternity and assume parental responsibilities for the child.165 
 
IV. PARENTHOOD BY INTENT 
 
 If the cases of K.M. v. E.G., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., and L.F. v. Breit 
teach us anything, it is that parenthood is based on action and intent 
rather than biology.166  One of the earliest cases in which a court 
entertained the idea of parenthood by intent was in 1968, when the 
Supreme Court of California held in People v. Sorenson that the 
husband’s consent to his wife’s artificial insemination with a donor’s 
sperm made him a parent.167  As the court said, it was “safe to assume 
that without [the husband]'s active participation and consent the child 
would not have been procreated.”168  The concept of parenthood by 
intent was not really expanded beyond egg and sperm donations, 
however, for many years.   
Legal scholar, Marjorie Shultz, was one of the first to argue for 
its application to surrogacy.169  Drawing on John Stuart Mill and 
Immanuel Kant, Shultz stressed the importance of autonomy and 
respect for the life choices of private parties.170  She argued that 
contractual agreements of surrogacy should be upheld because doing 
otherwise “denies the need for diversity and individual choice in the 
most intimate areas of life, and imposes the standardized conventional 
morality of particular groups and classes in the name of ‘privacy.’”171  
She also noted that “biological connection will not guarantee love or 
                                                 
 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 328 (citing In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1989)).   
165 L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 719 (Va. 2013). 
166 See also Hill, supra note 33, at 414 (“What is fundamental in rendering a 
biological progenitor a parent is not the biological tie itself, however, but the 
preconception intention and the preconception and post-conception acts which the 
biological relation evinces.”). 
167 People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 498-500 (Cal. 1968). 
168 Id. at 499.   
169 Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An 
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 303 (1990). 
170 Id. at 328.   
171 Id. at 348. 
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adequate care,” whereas children “conceived and born because their 
parents chose to bring them into being . . . will start life with parents 
who wanted and prepared for their advent.”172  Such children owe their 
existence to their “progenitors' individual intentions, their reciprocal 
decisions, and their behavior and expectations in the wake of such 
decisions.”173  Furthermore, but for the intent-driven actions of the 
intended parents, other parties, e.g. gamete donors and/or surrogates, 
would not be involved.174  Based on these principles, traditional 
surrogates should not be given maternal rights.   
 Recognizing intended parents as the parents of children at birth 
could eliminate all of the policy issues and moral conundrums 
presented by traditional surrogacy.  As John Hill wrote:  
 
If the intended parents are recognized as the parents of 
the child, then it is difficult to see how they could be 
guilty of buying their own baby.  Similarly, if the 
surrogate is deemed not to be the mother of the child, 
she cannot, as a logical matter, be culpable for baby-
selling.175 
 
Most important, perhaps, is that if intended parents are the parents of 
their child at the moment of that child’s birth, then there is no need for 
adoption, and the possibility of the traditional surrogate changing her 
mind is eliminated.  It is time for intent to matter.176  While seemingly 
parentless under this system, unintended children would be the 
children of their genetic parents by default.177  Intent could simply be 
used to trump the interests of other parties such as a traditional 
surrogate. 
 
A. California and Beyond 
 
The California Supreme Court has already embraced 
parenthood by intent, though they have not yet extended this reasoning 
to preclude traditional surrogates from being parents.178  The court in 
                                                 
 
172 Id. at 343. 
173 Id. at 376.   
174 Hill, supra note 33, at 415.   
175 Id. at 356 (citation omitted).   
176 Cf. id. at 414-15 (noting that many other areas of law already include mental state 
as a relevant factor).   
177 Cf. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“[A] deliberate procreator is as responsible as a casual inseminator.”). 
178 See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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Johnson v. Calvert stressed the importance of “[t]he mental concept of 
the child” and giving “credit” to the “initiating parents” as 
“conceivers” of the concept.179  Such a concept “creates expectations 
in the initiating parents of a child, and it creates expectations in society 
for adequate performance on the part of the initiators as parents of the 
child.”180  The court also made a point that the entire surrogacy 
process was initiated by, organized by, and would not have happened 
but for the intending parents.181  The key to intended parenthood is that 
the intended parents are the instigators.  According to In re Buzzanca, 
this concept can be used to determine the parents of a child in any 
situation where the child would not exist were it not for the actions of 
his or her intended parents.182  Intent can be the deciding factor in such 
cases, even when the intended mother neither gestates nor has a 
genetic link to the child.183 
States that treat the two types of surrogacy differently184 are 
inherently inconsistent.  As already discussed, genetic contribution is 
not enough to give rise to parentage.185  Noting that, Nancy Polikoff 
pointed out that the only factor left to give a traditional surrogate a 
claim to parentage is gestation.186  However, recognizing such a claim 
undermines gestational surrogacy, which often denies the parentage 
claims of gestational surrogates.187  Taken a step further, gestation 
should not be a relevant factor in determining parentage in surrogacy 
cases.   
A claim to parentage based on gestation arises from alleged 
physical and emotional ties to the child carried.  There is some 
argument to be made that whoever gestates the child should be its 
mother because of an alleged bond formed in the womb.188  The 
existence of a bond between gestating women and the babies they 
                                                 
 
179 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (citing Andrea E. Stumpf, 
Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE 
L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).   
180 Id.      
181 Id. at 782; see also Hill, supra note 33, at 356 n.12 (“(1) [T]he intended parents 
must plan to have a child before the conception of the child; (2) they must take 
morally permissible measures, not limited to biological procreation, to bring a child 
into the world; and (3) they must meet certain minimally adequate conditions to be 
able to raise and care for the child.”). 
182 In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291. 
183 Id. at 290.   
184 See discussion supra Part II.B.   
185 See discussion supra Part III.   
186 See Polikoff, supra note 35.   
187 Id.; see also discussion supra Parts II.B-C.   
188 Hill, supra note 33, at 397 (“[W]omen often report feelings of loyalty toward the 
fetus early in pregnancy, sometimes as early as the end of the first trimester.”). 
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carry is far from universal, however, as one study revealed that “[o]nly 
41% first felt love [for their babies] during pregnancy.”189  
Furthermore, the degree to which a surrogate, of any type, bonds with 
the child she carries may be a function of the expectations of the 
surrogate, and knowing that she has no claim to parenthood could 
“mitigate” feelings of attachment.190  The physical connection 
argument is perhaps more concrete, as actions of the surrogate during 
gestation can have lasting effects on the child she carries.191  One court 
mentioned the crucial role that a gestating woman’s endocrine system 
plays in the development of the child she carries.192  However, as this 
is a normal part of gestation, this could be seen as simply part of a 
surrogate’s job.  She is just doing what she agreed to do.   
 
B. Autonomous Decisions 
 
Currently, a traditional surrogate may change her mind and 
keep the child she carried in all states.193  This is because traditional 
surrogacy agreements are treated as adoptions.194  But traditional 
surrogates should not be treated as mothers.  A traditional surrogate 
should not be able to give up for adoption a child that is not hers.  
More importantly, the agreement that the traditional surrogate and the 
intended parents entered into should be honored.  This is true for three 
reasons: deontological, consequential, and feminist.  First, “people 
generally should be held to their promises simply because promise-
keeping is a good in itself.”195  Second, intended parents rely on the 
surrogate to keep her promise.196  Third, not allowing a woman to 
voluntarily agree to give up her child irrevocably before its birth 
                                                 
 
189 Id. at 398 (citing J.H. Kennell & M.H. Klaus, Mother-Infant Bonding: Weighing 
the Evidence, 4 DEV. REV. 275, 281 (1984)). 
190 Id. at 398-99; see also id. at 398 (stating that studies have shown that expectations 
shape how a woman feels towards a child she carries).   
191 Fetal alcohol syndrome, for example, can occur when a woman drinks alcohol 
while she is pregnant.  Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Causes, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/fetal-alcohol-
syndrome/DS00184/DSECTION=causes (last visited Dec. 15, 2013).   
192 A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
193 See generally discussion supra Part II. 
194 See generally discussion supra Part II. 
195 Hill, supra note 33, at 415. 
196 Id. at 416.   
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implies a lack of belief in her ability to make such decisions.197  As 
one scholar put it: 
 
[I]f a surrogate is released from her agreement because 
she could not assess what her emotions would be at the 
end of the pregnancy, how can any person be held to 
any agreement when their emotions may change over 
time?  What does this rationale for validating breach of 
the surrogacy agreement say about women's capabilities 
and trustworthiness?198 
 
Allowing surrogates to change their minds after birth “reinforces 
stereotypes of women as unstable, as unable to make decisions and 
stick to them, and as necessarily vulnerable to their hormones and 
emotions.”199  As Margaret Sanger said, “No woman can call herself 
free until she can choose consciously whether she will or will not be a 
mother.”200  We must respect the ability of traditional surrogates to 
irrevocably relinquish parental claims on the child they carry before 
the child’s birth.   
 
V. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
 No discussion of who should be a parent can be complete 
without at least mentioning the best interests of the child.  In all fifty 
states, courts decide custody disputes between parents based on their 
assessment of the best interests of the child.201  However, such custody 
                                                 
 
197 Cf. Shultz, supra note 169, at 384 (“[Allowing] revocability expresses the idea 
that the biological experience of motherhood necessarily ‘trumps’ all other 
considerations.”). 
198 Jessica H. Munyon, Protectionism and Freedom of Contract: The Erosion of 
Female Autonomy in Surrogacy Decisions, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717 (2003); see 
also Nicole Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements 
Under California Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 110 (1991) (“[I]f each individual 
woman is a mature, free moral agent, then she is capable of making this decision 
based on the circumstances of her own life . . . .”).   
199 Shultz, supra note 169, at 384.   
200 Margaret Sanger, A Parents' Problem or Woman's?, 3 BIRTH CONTROL REV. 3, 6 
(1919), available at http://birthcontrolreview.net/Birth%20Control%20Review/1919-
03%20March.pdf.   
201 See generally Child Welfare Information Gateway: Determining the Best Interests 
of the Child, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2012), available at 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2013); Child Custody, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, 0080 
SURVEYS 3 (West 2007). 
2014]              THE PROBLEM OF TRADITIONAL SURROGACY                 169  
 
disputes only affect parental rights after the birth of the child, and they 
have no effect on parentage at birth.   
In Illinois, for example, “there is a rebuttable presumption that 
a parent is unfit” if her second newborn’s “blood, urine, or meconium” 
contains traces of controlled substances at birth when this is that 
parent’s second child with such results.202  In such cases, the woman 
who gave birth to the child may have her parental rights terminated,203 
and custody will be decided based on the child’s best interests.204  
Such a ruling, however, does not change the fact that, at the time of the 
child’s birth, that woman was the child’s mother.205  Intended parents, 
rather than traditional surrogates, should be automatically recognized 
as legal parents upon the birth of their child in a similar way.  As such, 
a custody ruling on best interests should have no bearing on whether 
the intended parents are the original parents of the child.206 
 Even if the best interests of a child are relevant in determining 
parentage of children born as a result of surrogacy agreements, the best 
interests are served.  As one court put it, it is in a child’s best interest 
to have established legal parents upon his or her birth because:  
 
Delays in establishing parentage may, among other 
consequences, interfere with a child's medical treatment 
in the event of medical complications arising during or 
shortly after birth; may hinder or deprive a child of 
inheriting from his legal parents should a legal parent 
die intestate before a postbirth action could determine 
parentage; may hinder or deprive a child from 
collecting Social Security benefits . . . ; and may result 
in undesirable support obligations as well as custody 
disputes.207 
                                                 
 
202 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(k) (West 2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2013). 
203 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-23 (West 2013). 
204 As defined by ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 315.30 (2013). 
205 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4 (West 2013); cf. Shultz, supra note 169, at 341 (“Even 
under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who their parents will be, 
or for that matter, in whether they will be conceived or born.”). 
206 Of course, if the intended parents abuse or neglect their child, they could have 
their parental rights terminated later, just as any parent could.  See, e.g., 705 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 405/2-22 (West 2013). 
207 Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (Mass. 
2001); cf. Hill, supra note 33, at 414 (mentioning “important policy considerations in 
assuring the identity of the parents of the child from the time of conception”).  But cf. 
id. at 364 (citing Russell, supra note 56, at 622) (“[A]ll states apply a presumption 
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Despite this, as already stated, best interests should not apply in a 
framework where intended parents simply are the legal parents upon 
their child’s birth.   
 
VI. UNIFORM POLICY ATTEMPTS: NOT FAR ENOUGH 
 
 So what should a statute that embraces traditional surrogacy 
look like?  First, it needs to allow surrogacy generally.  Second, it 
should not recognize surrogates of any type (traditional or gestational) 
as mothers of the children they carry.  Finally, it should rely on intent 
when determining parentage at birth in cases involving assisted 
reproductive technology (e.g. surrogacy).  The distinction made 
between traditional and gestational surrogacy, whereby some states 
recognize intended parents as parents in cases of gestational surrogacy 
and not in cases of traditional surrogacy, needs to disappear.  A 
surrogate is a surrogate.  Two promulgated model acts come close to 
satisfying these criteria: Article 8 of the Uniform Parentage Act of 
2002,208 and Article 7 of the American Bar Association Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology of 2008.209 
 
A. Uniform Parentage Act 
 
  Under the Uniform Parentage Act, “‘[g]estational mother’ 
means an adult woman who gives birth to a child under a gestational 
agreement.”210  This definition encompasses both traditional and 
gestational surrogates.  Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a surrogacy 
agreement requires the surrogate to relinquish her parental rights and 
bestows them instead upon the intended parents.211  Such surrogacy 
agreements must be validated by a court of competent jurisdiction.212  
Prior to this validation, intended parents must undergo a home study 
and must be evaluated according to the same standards by which 
prospective adoptive parents are evaluated.213  This is somewhat 
problematic because it treats surrogacy like adoption, seemingly 
                                                                                                                   
 
that placement of the child with its natural parent is in the best interests of the 
child.”).   
208 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8 (2002). 
209 See ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, art. 7 
(2008), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.  
210 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 102(11) (2002). 
211 Id. § 801(a)(2)-(3).   
212 Id. §§ 802-803. 
213 Id. § 803(b)(2). 
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involving a best interests of the child analysis.214  However, once the 
agreement is validated, the surrogate may only terminate the 
agreement prior to pregnancy.215   
One other possibly problematic aspect of the Uniform 
Parentage Act’s proposed surrogacy framework is that the intended 
parents must seek a court order confirming their parentage after the 
birth of their child,216 which raises a possibility that a surrogate could 
change her mind and try to seek and/or enforce parental rights to the 
child.  However, section 807(c) implies that this order will be granted 
automatically upon a showing that the surrogacy agreement was 
previously validated by a court.217  While there is perhaps too much 
government oversight under the Uniform Parentage Act system, it 
takes steps in the right direction.   
 
B. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology 
 
 Like the Uniform Parentage Act, the American Bar Association 
Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology includes 
both traditional surrogates and gestational surrogates under the same 
framework, calling them both “gestational carriers.”218  Alternative A 
of Article 7 describes a surrogacy agreement procedure involving 
judicial validation that is almost identical to that described by the 
Uniform Parentage Act.219  Alternative B, however, merely involves 
an administrative procedure of filing the surrogacy agreement with the 
relevant state agency before or within twenty-four hours of the birth.220  
Under Alternative B, the intended parents are considered the parents of 
the child and vested with parental rights and responsibilities from the 
moment of the child’s birth, while the surrogate is specifically 
excluded from being a parent of the child.221  The only downside to 
Alternative B is that it requires at least one of the intended parents to 
contribute a gamete towards the creation of their child.222  As it 
requires a genetic link to the child in order to recognize parentage, 
Alternative B does not go far enough in recognizing intended families.  
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It also raises a question of policy consistency: if the genetic connection 
to the intended parents matters, why does the genetic connection to a 
traditional surrogate not matter?  Such an inconsistency in an area as 
controversial as surrogacy could be an opening for judges to pick apart 
the statute and erode the certainty that intended parents should have in 
their irrevocable parental rights.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 In conclusion, traditional surrogates are not mothers, and they 
should not be given maternal rights.  If neither gestation nor genetics 
alone give rise to motherhood, then combining them in one person 
should not make that person a mother.  It is true that genetics and 
gestation combined have been the very definition of motherhood since 
time immemorial, but assisted reproductive technology has changed 
that.  We now enter an era where babies may soon be gestated without 
need of a surrogate’s uterus.223  As technology advances, however, 
traditional surrogacy will remain a cheaper and less medically 
complicated option.  It should not be ignored.  Thus, intended parents 
who elect traditional surrogacy should be protected from their 
surrogate changing her mind.   
A traditional surrogate is different from a mother in one 
important respect: intent.  This intent to create the child should vest the 
intended parents with parental rights upon the child’s birth.  If the 
traditional surrogate is never the mother, the worry of her changing her 
mind is removed.  Intended parents do not need consent to take a child 
if the child is already theirs.      
 
 
                                                 
 
223 Soraya Chemaly, What Do Artificial Wombs Mean for Women?, RH REALITY 
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